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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper advances three fundamental propositions regarding money: 
 
(1) As R. W. Clower (1965) famously put it, money buys goods and goods buy 
money, but goods do not buy goods. 
 
(2) Money is always debt; it cannot be a commodity from the first proposition 
because, if it were, that would mean that a particular good is buying goods. 
 
(3) Default on debt is possible.  
 
These three propositions are used to build a theory of money that is linked to common 
themes in the heterodox literature on money. The approach taken here is integrated with 
Hyman Minsky’s (1986) work (which relies heavily on the work of his dissertation 
adviser, Joseph Schumpeter [1934]); the endogenous money approach of Basil Moore; 
the French-Italian circuit approach; Paul Davidson’s (1978) interpretation of John 
Maynard Keynes, which relies on uncertainty; Wynne Godley’s approach, which relies 
on accounting identities; the “K” distribution theory of Keynes, Michal Kalecki, Nicholas 
Kaldor, and Kenneth Boulding; the sociological approach of Ingham; and the chartalist, 
or state money, approach (A. M. Innes, G. F. Knapp, and Charles Goodhart). Hence, this 
paper takes a somewhat different route to develop the more typical heterodox conclusions 
about money.  
 
Keywords: Money; Credit; Debt; Uncertainty; Default; Unit of Account; Heterodox; 
Circuit Approach; Godley; Minsky; Knapp; Schumpeter; Endogenous Money 
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The exposition here will rely on three fundamental propositions regarding money: 
 
1. As Clower (1965) famously put it, money buys goods and goods buy money, but goods 
do not buy goods. 
2. Money is always debt; it cannot be a commodity from the first proposition because if it 
were that would mean that a particular good is buying goods. 
3. Default on debt is possible.  
 
These three propositions will provide sufficient structure to build a theory of money. I 
will link the discussion to common themes in the heterodox literature on money. The 
approach taken here is not meant to replace the more usual Post Keynesian (Davidson 
1978; Harcourt 2008; Kaldor and Trevithick 1981) and Institutionalist (Dillard 1980) 
approaches, but rather is meant to supplement them. For example, this discussion will be 
linked to Minsky’s (1986) work (that relied heavily on his dissertation advisor, 
Schumpeter [1934]), to the endogenous money approach of Moore (1988), to the French-
Italian circuit approach (Graziani 1990; Lavoie 1985; Parguez 2002), to Davidson’s 
(1978) interpretation of Keynes that relies on uncertainty, to the approaches that rely 
heavily on accounting identities (Godley 1996)—and the “K” distribution theory of 
Keynes (1930, 1964), Kalecki (1971), Kaldor (1955–6), and Kenneth Boulding (1985)—
to the sociological approach of Ingham (2000, 2004), and to the chartalist or state money 
approach (Innes 1913; Knapp 1924; Goodhart 1998; Wray 1998, 2004). Hence, we will 
take a somewhat different route to develop the more-or-less heterodox conclusions about 
money.  
 
1. GOODS DON’T BUY GOODS 
 
The typical orthodox story of money’s origins is too well-known to require much 
reflection: because of the inefficiencies of barter, traders choose one particular 
commodity to serve as the money numeraire (Innes 1913; Wray 1998; Ingham 2000). A 
hypothetical evolutionary process runs through the discovery of a money multiplier 
(notes issued on the basis of reserves of the money commodity) to government   3
monopolization of the commodity reserve and finally to the substitution of commodity 
money by a fiat money (Wray 2004). What’s important is not the historical details of this 
transformation, but rather the view of the role played by money. Since the market and 
commodity production analytically precede money, money is not essential, although it 
plays a lubricating role. This is why it is tempting to do “real analysis” and to presume 
that in the long run, money must be neutral. Note that it is not only neoclassical 
economics that falls victim to this mistake (see Kregel 1985). 
If we begin with the proposition that goods cannot buy goods then we must look 
elsewhere for the nature of money. And we cannot presume that markets come before 
money for the simple reason that until money exists there cannot be “exchanges” (sales). 
Further, money is not something that is produced—it is not a commodity that is produced 
by labor (otherwise it would be a “good buying a good”), nor is it something sought to 
directly satisfy the kinds of individual needs or desires that motivate production of 
commodities. At most, we can say that we seek money because it provides access to the 
commodities that satisfy those desires. (To be sure, Post Keynesians follow Keynes in 
asserting that money hoards “quell the disquietude”—but that in turn is because 
possession of money provides some measure of certainty in an economy that limits 
access to livelihood to those with money.) 
Readers will recognize the similarity to Keynes’s (1964) argument that money has 
“a zero, or at any rate a very small elasticity of production,” meaning it “cannot be 
readily produced” so that “labour cannot be turned on at will by entrepreneurs to produce 
money” (1964: 230), and as well to the argument that “unemployment develops, that is to 
say, because people want the moon—men cannot be employed when the object of desire 
(i.e., money) is something which cannot be produced and the demand for which cannot 
be readily choked off” (1964: 235). He also notices that “the characteristic which has 
traditionally supposed to render gold especially suitable for use as the standard of value, 
namely, its inelasticity of supply, turns out to be precisely the characteristic which is at 
the bottom of the trouble” (1964: 235–6).  
Keynes is making a slightly different point here—he is linking money to 
unemployment that cannot be resolved by shifting displaced labor to the production of 
the money commodity. Yet elsewhere—especially in the drafts to the General Theory—  4
he explicitly presumed that the purpose of production in a monetary economy is to 
accumulate money (Wray 1990, 1998). Indeed, this recognition must underlie these 
statements above, for it is the desire for money that causes its return as the “rooster” that 
sets the standard to rise above what can be obtained on nonmoney assets. That, in turn, is 
what causes effective demand to be so low that unemployment results, and it is because 
labor is not involved in any significant way in the production of money that the labor 
cannot be diverted to its production. Hence, Clower’s argument that “goods do not buy 
goods,” that money is not a commodity produced by labor, must underlie Keynes’s view. 
The claim that a capitalist economy is a “monetary production economy” is of 
course also adopted by Marx and Veblen and their followers (Dillard 1980). The purpose 
of production is to accumulate money—not to barter the produced commodities for other 
commodities. As Heilbroner (1985) argues, this provides a “logic” to production that 
makes it possible to do economic analysis. Analysis from Marx’s departments, to the 
circuit approach, to Godley’s (1996) sectoral balances and stock-flow consistency, to 
Kalecki’s (1971[1936]) profits equation, and even to GDP accounting all rely on this 
“logic.” On one level, this is obvious. We need a unit for accounting purposes to 
aggregate heterogeneous items: wages, profits, rents; investment, consumption, 
government spending; apples, oranges, and widgets. As Keynes (1964[1936], chapter 4) 
argued there are only two obvious units of account at hand—labor hours or the money 
wage unit. The Classical tradition focused on the first while most of Keynes’s followers 
focused exclusively on the second, although some, like Dillard, followed Keynes’s lead 
by using both. 
The Marx-Veblen-Keynes monetary theory of production means to say something 
more than that we need a handy universal unit for accounting purposes. Money is the 
object of production—it is not merely the way we measure the value of output. It is 
because money does not take any particular commodity form that it can be the purpose of 
production of all particular commodities. It is the general representation of value—it buys 
all commodities and all commodities buy (or, at least attempt to buy) money. Actually, if 
a commodity cannot buy money, it really is not a commodity—it has no market value. 
Commodities obtain their value—they become commodities—by exchanging for the   5
universal representation of social value, money. By the same token, obtaining money 
allows us access to all commodities that are trying to buy money.  
This presents the possibility of disappointment: the fruits of production enter the 
market but fail to buy money. There are consequences following on the failure to sell 
produced commodities, including a decision to cease production. Labor power, itself, is a 
produced commodity (separate from the free laborer, of course, who cannot be bought or 
sold) that seeks to exchange for money but may find unemployment instead. However, 
not only is the purpose of production to obtain money, but the production process itself is 
one of “production of commodities by means of commodities,” as Sraffa (1960) put it. 
And those commodities (including labor power, as well as other produced means of 
production) can only be purchased with money. In other words, the production process 
itself begins with money on the expectation of ending up with more money (M-C-C’-M’). 
Not only is production required to result in sales for money, but it must begin with 
money. Production is thoroughly monetary. It cannot begin with commodities, because 
the commodities must have been produced for sale for money. Analysis must also 
therefore begin with money.  
We cannot begin with the barter paradigm. We cannot remove money from the 
analysis as if it were some veil hiding the true nature of production. We cannot imagine 
that in some hypothetical long run money will somehow become a neutral force, just as it 
was back in the days when Robinson Crusoe bartered with Friday.  
 
2. MONEY IS DEBT 
 
We have argued that money is not a commodity, but we have not said much about what it 
is, beyond arguing that it is a unit of account. However, a unit of measurement is not 
something that can ever be obtained through a sale. No one can touch or hold a 
centimeter of length or a centigrade of temperature. We have said that we buy money by 
selling commodities, but it is clear that if money is just a unit of account—the dollar, the 
euro, the yen—that is impossible.  
We can get somewhat closer if we think of the analogy to the electronic 
scoreboard (with an array of LED lights that can display numbers) at a sporting match—  6
say American football. When a team scores a touchdown, the official scorer awards 
points, and electronic pulses are sent to the appropriate combination of LEDs so that the 
scoreboard will show the number six. As the game progresses, point totals are adjusted 
for each team. The points have no real physical presence, they simply reflect a record of 
the performance of each team according to the rules of the game. They are valuable 
because the team that accumulates the most points is deemed the “winner”—perhaps 
rewarded with fame and fortune. Further, sometimes points are taken away after a review 
by officials determines that rules were broken and that penalties should be assessed. The 
points that are taken away do not really go anywhere—they simply disappear as the 
scorekeeper deducts them from the score. 
Similarly, in the game we call the “economy,” sales of commodities for money 
lead to “points” credited to the “score” that is (mostly) kept by financial institutions. 
Unlike the game of football, in the game of life, every “point” that is awarded to one 
player is deducted from the “score” of another—either reducing the payer’s assets or 
increasing her liabilities. Accountants in the game of life are very careful to ensure that 
financial accounts always balance. The payment of wages leads to a debit of the 
employer’s “score” at the bank, and a credit to the employee’s “score,” but at the same 
time, the wage payment eliminates the employer’s obligation to pay accrued wages as 
well as the employee’s legal claim to wages. So, while the game of life is a bit more 
complicated than the football game, the idea that record keeping in terms of money is a 
lot like record keeping in terms of points can help us to remember that money is not a 
“thing” but rather is a unit of account in which we keep track of all the debits and 
credits—or, “points.” 
However, the financial institution is not simply an uninterested scorekeeper. The 
“scores” on its balance sheet are liabilities—its IOUs are the points credited to players. 
We will have much more to say about the role played by financial institutions in the next 
section. Here we only want to focus on the “dual” debt nature of the money “scores.” 
First, as discussed above, production must begin with money, and that money is a 
“score” that represents an IOU. Typically, it is a demand deposit liability of a bank. It is 
matched on the other side of the bank’s balance sheet by a loan, which represents the debt 
of the borrower in whose name the bank’s IOU is issued. In other words, one who wants   7
to undertake production of commodities (by means of purchasing commodities) must 
issue an IOU to the bank (a “loan” held as the bank’s asset) and obtain in return a bank 
deposit (the bank’s liability). The commodities to be used as means of production are 
then purchased by transferring the deposit (the bank debits the producer’s deposit and 
credits the deposits of the sellers of means of production). When the producer finishes the 
production process and sells the produced commodities, her deposit account is credited 
and the purchasers of the sold commodities have their deposit accounts debited. At this 
point, if the producer desires, she can use her deposit account to “repay” the loan (the 
bank simultaneously debits the demand deposit and the loan). All of this can be done 
electronically and is rather like our scorekeeper who takes points off the scoreboard. 
However, if we end up back where we started—with the deposit and the loan 
wiped clean—the producer seems to have engaged in an entirely purposeless endeavor, 
borrowing to produce commodities sold to repay the loan. The money created in the first 
step is simply retired in the last. That of course is not the monetary production economy 
of Marx, Keynes, and Veblen—which must aim to end up with more money than it starts 
with. Further, the bank’s engagement in this process would also be senseless—it accepted 
an IOU and created one, and finally ends up with all “scores” back at zero. Hence we 
have to account for profits of producers and interest (hence, profits) earned by banks. In a 
moment we will turn to that issue. For now let us conclude that the debt of the producer is 
retired by selling the produced commodities (“realizing” the monetary value) and retiring 
the loan by surrendering its deposits accumulated through the sales. The bank cancels its 
debt (demand deposit) at the same time that it cancels the producer’s IOU (loan). 
The second sense in which the producer is indebted is Schumpeterian: the 
producer commands some of society’s means of production at the beginning of the 
production process before actually contributing to society. The producer’s IOU (held by 
the bank) represents a social promise that she will temporarily remove commodities on 
the condition that she will later supply commodities to society. We can view all 
commodity production as social, beginning with commodities that were already socially 
produced in order to combine them in some manner to produce a (usually) different set of 
commodities. When those newly produced commodities find a market (buying money), 
the entrepreneur’s social debt is redeemed. Schumpeter (1934) argued that when the   8
entrepreneur removes means of production from the sphere of circulation this can lead to 
temporary inflation. However, if the production process actually results in commodities 
of greater total value, the redemption of the debt to society more than makes up for the 
temporary inflation, imparting a long-term deflationary tendency.  
For Schumpeter, this is expected when the entrepreneur innovates—a new 
production process that increases capacity to produce commodities. Hence, Schumpeter 
focused on the role played by banks in financing innovation—providing credit to allow 
the entrepreneur to claim social productive resources for a new production process that 
will increase social production. While he recognized that all production begins and ends 
with money, he did not view money as very important when it comes to normal 
production and circulation of commodities. A given quantity of money can circulate a 
given amount of production, as something like Keynes’s (1973: 208) “revolving fund of 
finance.” But new credit allows the innovative entrepreneur to break free from the 
circular flow, creating new purchasing power that shifts resources from some existing use 
toward the innovative practice. If successful, the debt is repaid—in both senses: the 
producer can retire her debt to the bank and to society as a whole. 
As Minsky (1993) argued, Schumpeter’s “vision” did not really allow him to see 
how profits (and interest) are generated at the aggregate level—because he did not have a 
theory of effective demand. However, in his department’s approach, Marx anticipated the 
“K” theory of Keynes, Kalecki (1971[1936]), Kaldor (1955–56), and Kenneth Boulding 
(see Boulding 1985) that recognizes the social creation of a “surplus” from which profits 
and interest are derived. There are many ways to approach this, but the most 
straightforward is through the Kalecki equation: aggregate profits equals the sum of 
investment plus the government deficit plus the trade surplus plus capitalist consumption 
(or, consumption out of profits) and less worker saving (saving out of wages). There is no 
need to go through this in detail. The basic idea is that because the wages received by 
workers who produce consumption goods represent only a part of the receipts from the 
sales of those goods (in other words, workers in the investment, foreign trade, and 
government sectors also buy consumer goods), the capitalists producing consumption 
goods receive gross profits (equal to total sales receipts less costs of producing the 
goods—which can be simplified to equal the wage bill in the consumption goods sector).   9
A great number of extensions can be made—workers can save and receive profits; 
capitalists can consume; we can analyze distributional effects as well as equilibrium 
growth paths; and so on.  
We can also return to our initiating bank loan and analyze a complete monetary 
circuit to repayment of the loan, as discussed above (see Graziani 1990; Lavoie 1985; 
Parguez 2002; Parguez and Seccareccia 2000). It can be shown that if we have two 
sectors (investment and consumption) profits can be realized in the form of bank deposits 
by one sector (consumption) equal to the wage bill in the other (investment). These 
profits can then be used to purchase the output of the second sector (i.e., investment 
goods—the production of the investment goods generates the profits needed to finance 
their purchase). However, it is more difficult to show how the second sector gets profits, 
and how interest on loans can be paid. A variety of solutions has been offered—banks 
pay interest on deposits so firms can pay equivalent interest on loans (which begs the 
question of bank profitability, sometimes resolved by having banks serve as a third sector 
that buys commodities). Or everything can be put in terms of rates of growth: the profits 
“deux ex machina” can be found in heterogeneous and overlapping production periods 
and circuits (only a portion of outstanding loans are retired), or by having ever-growing 
bank balance sheets (with interest essentially lent).  
One of the most interesting approaches is that of Vallegeas (2004), who follows 
actual accounting practice and argues that we should not take the “ending up with more 
money” dictum of monetary production too literally. Much production remains within the 
firm (for example, inventories) that is valued at market price—adding to accounting 
profit (“more money”). It is the “record keeping” that matters: profits are accounted for in 
monetary terms but do not have to be literally realized in the form of accumulated bank 
deposits. In any event, all of this amounts to technical detail that is not necessary for our 
exposition here. 
We conclude: money is debt. It need not have any physical existence other than as 
some form of record—mostly, an electrical entry on a computer. Money always involves 
two entries: debt of the issuer and asset of the creditor. Delivering an IOU back to the 
debtor results in its extinction: the debt is stricken, and so is the asset of the creditor. In 
practice, creation of money usually requires four entries: a prospective producer issues an   10
IOU to a bank and receives a demand deposit as an offsetting asset; the bank holds the 
producer’s IOU as its asset and issues the demand deposit as its liability. By convention 
we say that the producer is a “borrower” and the bank is a “lender”; we call the bank’s 
acceptance of the borrower’s IOU a “loan,” and the bank’s IOU “money.” However, that 
is rather arbitrary because both have borrowed and both have lent; both are debtors and 
both are creditors.  
 If money is debt, then as Minsky (1986: 228) said, anyone can create money by 
issuing an IOU denominated in the social unit of account. The problem is to get it 
accepted, that is, to get someone to hold your IOU. To become a debtor requires finding a 
creditor willing to hold the debt. But there are two sides to the equation: each must be 
willing to “create money” (issue an IOU) and each must be willing to “hold money” 
(hold the other’s IOU). And that raises many issues, of which we can only touch on a 
few. In the next section we address two issues related to willingness to hold money IOUs: 
liquidity and default. 
 
3. LIQUIDITY AND DEFAULT RISKS ON MONEY IOUs 
 
In an excellent essay, Goodhart (2008) argued that the reason that orthodoxy cannot find 
a role for money or for financial institutions in its rigorous models is because default is 
ruled out by assumption. All IOUs are equally safe because all promises are always kept 
as all debts are always paid. (This is the so-called “transversality condition.” Indeed, 
many such models employ a representative agent who is both debtor and creditor and 
who quite rationally would never default on herself in a schizophrenic manner!) This 
means that all can borrow at the risk-free interest rate and that any seller would accept a 
buyer’s IOU; there is no need for cash and never any liquidity constraint. Nor would we 
need any specialists such as banks to assess credit-worthiness, nor deposit insurance, nor 
a central bank to act as lender of last resort. Obviously, almost all interesting questions 
about money, financial institutions, and monetary policy are left to the side if we ignore 
liquidity and default risk. 
Let us begin with the most fundamental question about debt: just what is owed 
when an IOU is issued? All IOUs share one common requirement: the issuer must accept   11
back her own IOU when it is presented (Innes 1913; Wray 2004). As we discussed above, 
the bank takes back its own IOU (demand deposit) when a debtor presents it to pay off a 
loan. If you issue an IOU to your neighbor for a cup of sugar, the neighbor can present it 
to you to obtain sugar. Refusing your own debt when submitted for payment is a default.  
Another promise that many monetary IOUs carry is convertibility on demand (or 
on some specified condition such as a waiting period) to another monetary IOU or even 
to a commodity. For example, on a gold standard the government might promise to 
convert its currency (an IOU stamped on coin or paper) to so many ounces of precious 
metal. Or, a country on a fixed exchange rate might promise to convert its currency to so 
many units of a foreign currency. Banks promise to convert their demand deposit IOUs to 
domestic high powered money (currency or reserves at the central bank).  
It is important to note, however, that a promise to convert is not fundamental to 
issue of an IOU—it is in a sense voluntary. For example, modern “fiat” currencies on 
floating exchange rates are accepted with no promise to convert. Many attribute this to 
legal tender laws. Historically, sovereign governments have enacted legislation requiring 
their currencies to be accepted in payments. Indeed, paper currency issued in the US 
proclaims “this note is legal tender for all debts, public and private”; Canadian notes say 
“this note is legal tender”; and Australian paper currency reads “this Australian note is 
legal tender throughout Australia and its territories.” By contrast, the paper currency of 
the UK simply says “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of five pounds” (in 
the case of the five pound note; the promise appears to be the Queen’s, whose picture 
appears on the note). On the other hand, the euro paper currency makes no promises and 
has no legal tender laws requiring its use.  
Further, throughout history there are many examples of governments that passed 
legal tender laws, but still could not create a demand for their currencies—which were 
not accepted in private payments, and sometimes even rejected in payment by 
government. (In some cases, the penalty for refusing to accept a king’s coin included the 
burning of a red hot coin into the forehead of the recalcitrant—indicating that without 
compulsion, the population refused to accept the sovereign’s currency; see Wray 1998 
and Knapp 1973 [1924].) Hence, there are currencies that readily circulate without any 
legal tender laws (such as the euro) as well as currencies that were shunned even with   12
legal tender laws. Further, as we know, the US dollar circulates in a large number of 
countries in which it is not legal tender (and even in countries where its use is 
discouraged and perhaps even outlawed by the authorities). 
Modern currencies are often called “fiat currencies” because there is no promise 
made by government to redeem them for precious metal—their value is proclaimed by 
“fiat” (the government merely announces that a coin is worth a half-dollar without 
holding a reserve of precious metal equal in value to a half-dollar). Many students in 
economics courses are shocked when they are first told that there is “nothing” backing 
the currency in their pockets. While they had probably never contemplated actually 
taking the currency down to the Treasury to exchange it for gold, they had found comfort 
in the erroneous belief that there was “something” standing behind the currency—
perhaps a reserve of precious metal available for redemption. The UK currency’s 
“promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of five pounds” appears to offer a sound 
basis, implying that the Treasury holds something in reserve that it can use to make the 
promised payments. However, if one were to actually present to the UK government a 
five pound note, the Treasury would simply offer another five pound note, or a 
combination of notes and coins to sum to five pounds! Any citizen of the US or Australia 
would experience the same outcome at their own treasuries: a five dollar note can be 
exchanged for a different five dollar note, or for some combination of notes and coins to 
make five dollars. That is the extent of the government “promise to pay”!  
If currency cannot be exchanged for precious metal in many countries, if legal 
tender laws are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure acceptance of a currency, and if 
the government’s “promise to pay” really amounts to nothing (except exchanging its 
currency for its currency), then why would anyone accept a government’s currency? One 
of the most important powers claimed by sovereign government is the authority to levy 
and collect taxes (and other payments made to government including fees and fines). Tax 
obligations are levied in the national money of account—dollars in the US, Canada, and 
Australia. Further, the sovereign government also determines what can be delivered to 
satisfy the tax obligation. In all modern nations, it is the government’s own currency that 
is accepted in payment of taxes. While it appears that taxpayers mostly use checks drawn   13
on private banks to make tax payments, actually, when government receives these checks 
it debits the reserves of the private banks—reserves that are the central bank’s IOU.  
Effectively, private banks intermediate between taxpayers and government, 
making payment in currency and reserves on behalf of the taxpayers. Once the banks 
have made these payments, the taxpayer has fulfilled her obligation, so the tax liability is 
eliminated. 
We are now able to answer the question posed above: why would anyone accept 
government’s “fiat” currency? Because the government’s HPM (currency plus reserves) 
is the main thing (and usually the only thing) accepted by government in payment of 
taxes. It is true, of course, that government currency can be used for other purposes: coins 
can be used to make purchases from vending machines; private debts can be settled by 
offering government paper currency; and government money can be hoarded in “piggy 
banks” for future spending. However, these other uses of currency are all subsidiary, 
deriving from government’s willingness to accept its currency in tax payments. It is 
because anyone with tax obligations can use currency to eliminate these liabilities that 
government currency is in demand, and thus can be used in purchases or in payment of 
private obligations. The government cannot really force others to use its currency in 
private payments, or to hoard it in “piggy banks,” but government can force use of 
currency to meet tax obligations that it imposes. 
For this reason, neither reserves of precious metals (or foreign currencies) nor 
legal tender laws are necessary to ensure acceptance of the government’s currency. All 
that is required is imposition of a tax liability to be paid in the government’s currency. 
The “promise to pay” that is engraved on UK pound notes is superfluous and really quite 
misleading. The notes should actually read “I promise to accept this note in payment of 
taxes.” We know that the UK Treasury will not really pay anything (other than another 
note) when the five pound paper currency is presented. However, it will and must accept 
the note in payment of taxes. This is really how government currency is redeemed—not 
for gold, but in payments made to the government. Like all debtors, government must 
accept its own IOUs when presented to it, so tax obligations to government are met by 
presenting the government’s own IOUs to the tax collector. This is the fundamental   14
requirement of debt: the issuer must take it back in payment. A promise to convert can be 
added—as discussed below—but the promise to “redeem” its IOU in payment is primary. 
We can conclude that taxes drive money (Wray 1998). The government first 
creates a money of account (the dollar, the pound, the euro), and then imposes tax 
obligations in that national money of account. In all modern nations this is sufficient to 
ensure that many (indeed, most) debts, assets, and prices will also be denominated in the 
national money of account. The government is then able to issue a currency that is also 
denominated in the same money of account, so long as it accepts that currency in tax 
payment. It is not necessary to “back” the currency with precious metal, nor is it 
necessary to enforce legal tender laws that require acceptance of the national currency. 
For example, rather than engraving the statement “this note is legal tender for all debts, 
public and private,” all the sovereign government needs to do is to promise “this note will 
be accepted in tax payment” in order to ensure general acceptability. 
This gets us part way to an explanation of why money IOUs are almost without 
exception denominated in some state’s money of account—what Goodhart (1998) calls 
the “one nation, one money” rule that is rarely violated. The sovereign power chooses the 
money of account when it imposes a tax liability in that unit. Keynes also recognized the 
state’s role in choosing the money of account when he argued that the state  
 
comes in first of all as the authority of law which enforces the 
payment of the thing which corresponds to the name or 
description in the contracts. But it comes in doubly when, in 
addition, it claims the right to determine and declare what thing 
corresponds to the name, and to vary its declaration from time to 
time—when, that is to say, it claims the right to re-edit the 
dictionary. This right is claimed by all modern states and has 
been so claimed for some four thousand years at least.  
(Keynes 1930, vol. 1: 4)  
 
Enforceability of monetary contracts is part of the reason nongovernment money IOUs 
are written in the state’s money of account. 
In addition, money IOUs are often made convertible to the state’s IOUs—high 
powered money. This can make them more acceptable. Here’s the problem, however: 
merely agreeing to accept your own IOU in payment is a relatively easy promise to keep. 
But promising to convert your IOU to another entity’s IOU (especially on demand and at   15
a fixed exchange rate—which is necessary for par clearing in a money of account) is 
more difficult. It requires that one either maintain a reserve of the other entity’s IOUs, or 
that it have easy access to those IOUs when required to do the conversion. Failure to 
meet the promise of conversion is a default. Hence, there is additional default risk that 
arises from a promise to convert, to be weighed against the enhancement to its general 
acceptability.  
This gives rise to the concept of liquidity: how quickly can an asset be converted 
with little loss of value? Generally, the most liquid asset is the state’s own IOUs, so the 
conversion of other liabilities is often to HPM. Banks hold some HPM so that they can 
meet demands for conversion, but it is access to deposit insurance as well as to the central 
bank that makes the bank’s promise to convert secure. We can think of a pyramiding of 
liabilities on banks—IOUs issued by other institutions and households are convertible to 
bank liabilities (Bell 2001; Foley 1989). These other entities then work out arrangements 
that make it more likely that they can meet demands for conversion, such as overdraft 
facilities. Everything is then pyramided on the state’s IOUs—we can think of that as a 
leveraging of HPM (Wray 1998). 
All promises are not equally valid, however—risk of default varies on the IOUs. 
There is another fundamental principle of debts: one cannot pay one’s debt using one’s 
own IOUs. As discussed, when the sovereign is presented with its own IOU, it promises 
to exchange that IOU for another of its IOUs or it allows the presenter to “redeem” it in 
payment of taxes. To be sure, the state can retire its liabilities—by running a budget 
surplus—but it does not have to pay them down by using another’s IOU. All other 
entities must provide a second party or third party IOU to retire debt. For most purposes, 
it will be the liability of a bank that is used to make payments on one’s debt.  
Default risk on a bank’s IOUs is small (and nonexistent in the case of government 
guaranteed deposits), hence bank liabilities are widely accepted. Banks specialize in 
underwriting (assessing credit-worthiness of) “borrowers”—those whose IOUs they hold. 
Not only do banks intermediate between government and its taxpayers, but they also 
intermediate by accepting borrowers’ IOUs and issuing their own IOUs. The IOUs they 
hold generally have higher default risk (except in the case of government debt) and are 
less liquid than the IOUs they issue. For this service, they earn profits, in large part   16
determined by their ability to charge a higher interest rate on the IOUs they hold than the 
rate they must pay on their own. Again, the image of a debt pyramid is useful—those 
lower in the pyramid use the IOUs issued by entities higher in the pyramid to make 
payments and to retire debt. 
This leads us to the interest rate, which as Keynes said is a reward for parting with 
liquidity. Since government-issued currency (cash) is the most liquid asset, it does not 
have to pay interest; bank demand deposits can be just as liquid and for many purposes 
are even more convenient so they do not necessarily need to pay interest (in some cases 
banks charge fees for checking accounts; in others they do pay positive interest—this has 
to do with regulation and competition, issues we will not address). Other IOUs that are 
less liquid must pay interest to induce wealth-owners to hold them. In addition, interest 
compensates for default risk; this is in addition to the compensation for illiquidity of the 
asset. In chapter 17 of the General Theory, Keynes (1964 [1936]) develops a theory of 
asset pricing based on a preference for liquidity in a world in which the future is 
uncertain. Asset prices adjust (causing yields to change) until all of them are held. 
“Money,” the most liquid of these, sets the standard because it best satisfies the 
preference for liquidity. He goes on to explain how the desire for liquidity constrains 
effective demand and results in unemployment—topics beyond our scope (Keynes 1964 
[1936]; Davidson 1978). 
We return to Goodhart’s (2008) argument that orthodoxy has no room for money 
because there is no default risk. For Keynes, neoclassical economics (what he called 
“classical” economics) lacks a plausible theory of money holding precisely because there 
is no fundamental uncertainty, which is necessary to explain why liquidity has value. The 
two arguments are related, and explain why financial institutions are important: they 
issue liquid IOUs with little (or no) default risk. This is the reason why their IOUs are 
frequently classified as “money” while the money IOUs of others are not—in apparent 
contradistinction to Minsky’s (1986: 228) claim that “everyone can create money,” but, 
he goes on, “the problem is to get it accepted” (Minsky 1986).  
Banks are special in another way: almost all the assets they hold are purchased by 
issuing IOUs. Typically, a bank has 5–8% equity against its assets, meaning that its 
liabilities are equal to 92–95% of the value of its assets. This is an extremely high   17
leverage ratio (its asset to capital ratio is from 12.5 to 20). As Minsky (1986) put it, they 
finance their positions in assets by issuing debt. Without guarantees of access to the 
central bank (to make their liabilities more liquid) and to government insurance (to 
reduce default risk on their liabilities), banks could not operate with such leverage ratios.  
Note also that banks are strange firms: they do not produce commodities and mostly do 
not utilize commodities in their “production”—they are not a case of Sraffa’s “production 
of commodities by means of commodities.” They are true “intermediaries,” making 
profits not out of commodity production but rather by providing the liquid “money” 
needed for commodity production—creating their IOUs to purchase the IOUs of others, 
and reaping profits from the interest rate differential. It is this “alchemy” that leads to so 
much suspicion about the legitimacy of banks that seem to create “money” out of “thin 
air.” To be sure, it is also the potential source of financial crisis—another topic beyond 
our scope, but one whose importance was highlighted with the financial crisis that began 
in 2007! 
Finally, IOUs are not just held or presented for payment (of your own liability). 
They are also to varying degrees transferable. For example, your neighbor might transfer 
your sugar IOU—perhaps in payment of some sugar debt—to another neighbor, who 
could present it to you with a demand for sugar. Transferability of your IOU is limited to 
those who know you well and who trust that you are good for the sugar. Since “money” is 
commonly associated with transferability of a debt amongst third parties it is not 
surprising that government currency as well as bank liabilities are most often included in 
definitions of money. The liabilities of nonfinancial corporations or households are not 
usually called money because they do not circulate readily among third parties. 
(Securitization of home mortgage loans—as well as various kinds of insurance plus 
certified credit ratings—made them transferable to some degree.) What the lay person 
usually identifies as money is usually even narrower, something that can be used in a 
market as a medium of exchange—to buy a commodity. And that, of course, must be a 
monetary IOU that is highly acceptable—a government IOU, a bank IOU, or an IOU 
closely backed by a bank (such as your credit card debt).  
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
This brings us back to Clower’s dictum: money buys goods and goods buy money, but 
goods do not buy goods. That surprisingly insightful statement has led us on a long path 
through theory, institutions, and even a bit of monetary history and law. To be sure, we 
just barely scraped the surface of many of the issues of what turns out to be a complex 
and contentious topic. Indeed, “money” is arguably the most difficult and controversial 
subject in macroeconomics—what is money, what role does it play, and what should 
policy do about it are the questions that have busied most macroeconomists from the very 
beginning. The three basic propositions examined in this chapter have allowed us to 
construct the beginnings of answers to these questions. 
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